Arabs and Kurds

I have again fallen behind in my writing and find myself on the road, headed home at the end of my deployment, with way too much time to kill waiting for planes. So I’ll try to bang out the Arab-Kurd piece I wanted to use to wrap up my on-the-ground observations.

Of all the simmering hot spots in Iraq, tension between the Arabs and the Kurds might be the one more Americans are somewhat familiar with, since it led to an extended American mission to enforce a no-fly zone after the first Gulf War. The essence of the issue is this: the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan is very much disconnected from the Iraqi central government and desires to get even more disconnected. Secession would be most to their liking and they are forever pushing the boundaries that might get them there.

There are three Iraqi provinces that constitute Kurdistan: Dahuk, Arbil, and Sulaymaniyah. All are on the northern-most border of Iraq. If it were as simple as dealing with the isolation of these three provinces, tensions might have been significantly reduced a long time ago. But Kurds don’t just live in Kurdistan – there are substantial populations throughout northern Iraq, intermingled with equally substantial Arab populations, primarily Sunni. This provides the basis for disagreement over what, precisely, the Kurdistan boundaries ought to be, particularly regarding some large cities in northern Iraq outside the three provinces.

This tension results in areas we Americans refer to as the disputed areas, located along a cultural fault line called the disputed boundary. This becomes very problematic because the Kurds have their very own military, the Peshmerga, and Kurdish police which are both independent of the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police. All of these entities share responsibility for security in the disputed areas, and they don’t get along all that well. The areas has been fairly calm for quite a while because the U.S. established tri-partite security mechanisms, with Iraqi, Kurd, and U.S. forces working side-by-side, in order to enable U.S. forces to help everyone work together.

That situation changes later this year as the U.S. forces start packing up and heading south in order to fulfill the agreement to leave Iraq NLT 31 December 2011. I don’t have high expectations that the Arab and Kurd forces are going to suddenly bond and start working shoulder to shoulder for the betterment of Iraq. The Kurds are likely to resume trying to push the envelope of their autonomy and the first gem they would like to secure is Mosul, which has deep cultural significance for both ethnic groups. It was recently described as “the Jerusalem of Iraq,” a phrase that drew massive condemnation from Iraqi politicians but seems to me to be pretty close to the mark. Mosul was the scene of some large and unruly demonstrations, part of the rage sweeping the Mideast these recent months, and the Peshmerga sent several large formations south to the outskirts of Mosul, ostensibly to protect the citizens from violent extremists trying to capitalize on the presence of large gatherings.

This was a very alarming incident that kept the U.S. military and diplomatic leadership very busy for a period of time; ultimately all involved agreed that it was not a particularly healthy situation and would be dramatically improved if the Peshmerga returned to their bases. It would be nice if this were as simple as an “oops” and the status quo restored for the foreseeable future, but I’m guessing that the probability of that does not statistically differ from zero. Once the U.S. forces leave, the games begin. It could be awhile before a winner might be declared.

Thus ends this rather sad tale. The Shia-Sunni problem I discussed in last blog seems to be longer term, played out over several years as the soul of Iraq sorts itself out. The Arab-Kurd problem could escalate within months of the U.S. forces departure. There are a lot more players than just the Iraqi ethnic groups – Iran, Turkey, and Syria all have a stake in the game and will be active players. While I doubt this will play out to be considered monumental in the midst of all other Mideast turmoil, it is another bit of grief imposed upon a population that is largely fed up with the power posturing of politicians; folks who largely have no quarrel with ethno-sectarian differences but instead seek to just have a better life.

I thought a month ago that these last two blogs would address the major frictions I see coming for Iraq, but more recent events lead me to (hopefully) write about one more. The demonstrations held every week throughout Iraq are proving to be especially nasty in what I thought was the least likely venue: Kurdistan. Considered by Westerners as the most stable, most economically viable, and the most Western-friendly confines in all of Iraq, it turns out to be something else as well: the most suppressive. It looks like I’ll have a few days cooling my heels in Kuwait, so I expect I’ll offer up some thoughts on that problem soon.