I have again fallen behind in my writing and find myself on the road, headed home at the end of my deployment, with way too much time to kill waiting for planes. So I’ll try to bang out the Arab-Kurd piece I wanted to use to wrap up my on-the-ground observations.
Of all the simmering hot spots in Iraq, tension between the Arabs and the Kurds might be the one more Americans are somewhat familiar with, since it led to an extended American mission to enforce a no-fly zone after the first Gulf War. The essence of the issue is this: the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan is very much disconnected from the Iraqi central government and desires to get even more disconnected. Secession would be most to their liking and they are forever pushing the boundaries that might get them there.
There are three Iraqi provinces that constitute Kurdistan: Dahuk, Arbil, and Sulaymaniyah. All are on the northern-most border of Iraq. If it were as simple as dealing with the isolation of these three provinces, tensions might have been significantly reduced a long time ago. But Kurds don’t just live in Kurdistan – there are substantial populations throughout northern Iraq, intermingled with equally substantial Arab populations, primarily Sunni. This provides the basis for disagreement over what, precisely, the Kurdistan boundaries ought to be, particularly regarding some large cities in northern Iraq outside the three provinces.
This tension results in areas we Americans refer to as the disputed areas, located along a cultural fault line called the disputed boundary. This becomes very problematic because the Kurds have their very own military, the Peshmerga, and Kurdish police which are both independent of the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police. All of these entities share responsibility for security in the disputed areas, and they don’t get along all that well. The areas has been fairly calm for quite a while because the U.S. established tri-partite security mechanisms, with Iraqi, Kurd, and U.S. forces working side-by-side, in order to enable U.S. forces to help everyone work together.
That situation changes later this year as the U.S. forces start packing up and heading south in order to fulfill the agreement to leave Iraq NLT 31 December 2011. I don’t have high expectations that the Arab and Kurd forces are going to suddenly bond and start working shoulder to shoulder for the betterment of Iraq. The Kurds are likely to resume trying to push the envelope of their autonomy and the first gem they would like to secure is Mosul, which has deep cultural significance for both ethnic groups. It was recently described as “the Jerusalem of Iraq,” a phrase that drew massive condemnation from Iraqi politicians but seems to me to be pretty close to the mark. Mosul was the scene of some large and unruly demonstrations, part of the rage sweeping the Mideast these recent months, and the Peshmerga sent several large formations south to the outskirts of Mosul, ostensibly to protect the citizens from violent extremists trying to capitalize on the presence of large gatherings.
This was a very alarming incident that kept the U.S. military and diplomatic leadership very busy for a period of time; ultimately all involved agreed that it was not a particularly healthy situation and would be dramatically improved if the Peshmerga returned to their bases. It would be nice if this were as simple as an “oops” and the status quo restored for the foreseeable future, but I’m guessing that the probability of that does not statistically differ from zero. Once the U.S. forces leave, the games begin. It could be awhile before a winner might be declared.
Thus ends this rather sad tale. The Shia-Sunni problem I discussed in last blog seems to be longer term, played out over several years as the soul of Iraq sorts itself out. The Arab-Kurd problem could escalate within months of the U.S. forces departure. There are a lot more players than just the Iraqi ethnic groups – Iran, Turkey, and Syria all have a stake in the game and will be active players. While I doubt this will play out to be considered monumental in the midst of all other Mideast turmoil, it is another bit of grief imposed upon a population that is largely fed up with the power posturing of politicians; folks who largely have no quarrel with ethno-sectarian differences but instead seek to just have a better life.
I thought a month ago that these last two blogs would address the major frictions I see coming for Iraq, but more recent events lead me to (hopefully) write about one more. The demonstrations held every week throughout Iraq are proving to be especially nasty in what I thought was the least likely venue: Kurdistan. Considered by Westerners as the most stable, most economically viable, and the most Western-friendly confines in all of Iraq, it turns out to be something else as well: the most suppressive. It looks like I’ll have a few days cooling my heels in Kuwait, so I expect I’ll offer up some thoughts on that problem soon.
Wednesday, April 27, 2011
Friday, April 8, 2011
American Pie
I thought for certain that, as my time drew near to depart this place, time would stretch, hours would seem like days and days like forever. Instead, that end date is rushing toward me at warp speed and I find myself concerned about being personally and professionally prepared to leave. Suddenly the 14-hour work days and the seven day work weeks seem inadequate to the tasks yet before me.
I rate that a good thing, because the tasks will get done and the time will melt away all the more quickly. I am ready to go home. I am weary beyond words.
The people that surround me here in Iraq are awesome to work with and fun to be around in the few off hours we have, but they are not the family and friends I want to return to and this is not a place you can ever truly relax. I am delighted to have been able to contribute to the cause, but doubly delighted to be done with it.
I shouldn’t leave here without some sort of after action review, some deeply-thought insights into where this whole Mideast adventure is headed. So, in that spirit, I’ll vouch to complete this and at least one more blog to lay out two scenarios that have the potential to quickly unravel all that was raveled in the last eight years.
The first scenario is the struggle between fundamentalist versus moderate Islam; rule of church versus rule of law; theocratic versus democratic; Iran versus Iraq. Baby boomer readers will understand how the title of this blog was derived as I wrap it up.
The elections in Iraq just over a year ago were, by most standards, highly successful. It’s been a pretty rocky road since then, but the government remains mostly intact. When viewed through the lens of recent regional unrest, Iraqis are looking pretty good as far as self-determination goes. But not all is well in their world.
There remains, by any reasonable standards, a lot of violence. The Iraq/Pan-Arab media reports are rife with the stories, though the press here does not tend toward editorializing and insights to any particular event are often lacking. Still, the oft-branded culprit is Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI), a nefarious enough group of zombies with pretty much no self-redeeming features. My guess is that they get more credit than is due them.
There are two primary camps of bad guys in this country: Shia extremist groups and Sunni extremist groups. AQI is one of several in the latter. Sunnis are the minority Arab sect and held all of the cards during the reign of Saddam Hussein, so many of them have axes to grind now that their influence is beholden to votes rather than brutal suppression. The Shia camp has a pretty formidable list of organizations that, on the surface, should be pretty happy with the current state of affairs. But they are not.
All that I’m about to wax eloquent about here is largely speculation, based on a fair amount of observation, some personal prejudices, and a dash of paranoia. Iraqis, in general, seem very desirous of pulling themselves out of the depths of cultural despair and establishing their country as a shining example of tolerance and enlightenment. They experienced, in a truly horrific fashion, the downsides of pursuing deeply rooted ethnic and sectarian grudges and they are not inclined to revisit the issue. They are currently consumed with the unenviable task of clawing their way up from the bottom tiers of Maslow’s hierarchy and have high hopes that this democracy thing is going to solve some vexing issues that are now stifling progress.
The government, however, is struggling to come to grips with democracy. You hope that by giving everyone a voice you build a choir, but the sad truth is that you are much more likely to just get a lot of noise. Machismo still rules in these parts, and wasta is the coin of the realm. Politicians prefer to control rather than guide, and it’s hard to control a bunch of people that believe they have the basic rights associated with personal freedom.
Freedom is the ticket. It may well form a fault line that could split the country. This brings us back to the unhappy Shia extremist groups. Here’s the rub: the Shia were suppressed, sometimes violently, under previous Iraq regimes. Now they form the majority of the government, but many of them are less than happy with the direction the country is moving with its newfound freedoms.
There is a healthy appetite within the population for singing, dancing, drinking, cinema, orchestra, and any number of other seemingly normal societal undertakings. The unhappy Shia tend to frown upon such activities. Theirs is a more strict interpretation of acceptable Islamic behaviors, typically accompanied by an equally strict interpretation of how such transgressions should be managed. These folks are often joined at the hip with Iran, another Shia majority nation that is quite openly working to exert their influence in Iraq, seemingly with the intent to control the country, at least by proxy, once the U.S. military leaves.
Thus theocracy creeps into the picture, the potential for Iranian-backed influential Iraqis to steer the population toward a lifestyle dictated by Islamic fundamentalism rather than popular urges. Secularism has no home in that world. The probability of a growing rift between Arab sects seems certain. At the moment, the typical Iraqi appears to have little love for Iran, or for any other country they believe might be trying to exert influence on them (like the U.S.!). The seeming disconnect between how the Iraqis feel and how their leaders behave could have some very negative consequences.
Protests and demonstrations are all the rage here right now, but I couldn’t guess the outcome of unrest triggered by a push toward fundamentalist influence in Iraq. My concern is that I think Iraqis seek to embrace more of the simple joys in life. They want to dance, they want to sing. But if the departure of the U.S. troops becomes the impetus of a fundamentalist revival, December 31, 2011 might be known in Iraq as the day the music died.
I rate that a good thing, because the tasks will get done and the time will melt away all the more quickly. I am ready to go home. I am weary beyond words.
The people that surround me here in Iraq are awesome to work with and fun to be around in the few off hours we have, but they are not the family and friends I want to return to and this is not a place you can ever truly relax. I am delighted to have been able to contribute to the cause, but doubly delighted to be done with it.
I shouldn’t leave here without some sort of after action review, some deeply-thought insights into where this whole Mideast adventure is headed. So, in that spirit, I’ll vouch to complete this and at least one more blog to lay out two scenarios that have the potential to quickly unravel all that was raveled in the last eight years.
The first scenario is the struggle between fundamentalist versus moderate Islam; rule of church versus rule of law; theocratic versus democratic; Iran versus Iraq. Baby boomer readers will understand how the title of this blog was derived as I wrap it up.
The elections in Iraq just over a year ago were, by most standards, highly successful. It’s been a pretty rocky road since then, but the government remains mostly intact. When viewed through the lens of recent regional unrest, Iraqis are looking pretty good as far as self-determination goes. But not all is well in their world.
There remains, by any reasonable standards, a lot of violence. The Iraq/Pan-Arab media reports are rife with the stories, though the press here does not tend toward editorializing and insights to any particular event are often lacking. Still, the oft-branded culprit is Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI), a nefarious enough group of zombies with pretty much no self-redeeming features. My guess is that they get more credit than is due them.
There are two primary camps of bad guys in this country: Shia extremist groups and Sunni extremist groups. AQI is one of several in the latter. Sunnis are the minority Arab sect and held all of the cards during the reign of Saddam Hussein, so many of them have axes to grind now that their influence is beholden to votes rather than brutal suppression. The Shia camp has a pretty formidable list of organizations that, on the surface, should be pretty happy with the current state of affairs. But they are not.
All that I’m about to wax eloquent about here is largely speculation, based on a fair amount of observation, some personal prejudices, and a dash of paranoia. Iraqis, in general, seem very desirous of pulling themselves out of the depths of cultural despair and establishing their country as a shining example of tolerance and enlightenment. They experienced, in a truly horrific fashion, the downsides of pursuing deeply rooted ethnic and sectarian grudges and they are not inclined to revisit the issue. They are currently consumed with the unenviable task of clawing their way up from the bottom tiers of Maslow’s hierarchy and have high hopes that this democracy thing is going to solve some vexing issues that are now stifling progress.
The government, however, is struggling to come to grips with democracy. You hope that by giving everyone a voice you build a choir, but the sad truth is that you are much more likely to just get a lot of noise. Machismo still rules in these parts, and wasta is the coin of the realm. Politicians prefer to control rather than guide, and it’s hard to control a bunch of people that believe they have the basic rights associated with personal freedom.
Freedom is the ticket. It may well form a fault line that could split the country. This brings us back to the unhappy Shia extremist groups. Here’s the rub: the Shia were suppressed, sometimes violently, under previous Iraq regimes. Now they form the majority of the government, but many of them are less than happy with the direction the country is moving with its newfound freedoms.
There is a healthy appetite within the population for singing, dancing, drinking, cinema, orchestra, and any number of other seemingly normal societal undertakings. The unhappy Shia tend to frown upon such activities. Theirs is a more strict interpretation of acceptable Islamic behaviors, typically accompanied by an equally strict interpretation of how such transgressions should be managed. These folks are often joined at the hip with Iran, another Shia majority nation that is quite openly working to exert their influence in Iraq, seemingly with the intent to control the country, at least by proxy, once the U.S. military leaves.
Thus theocracy creeps into the picture, the potential for Iranian-backed influential Iraqis to steer the population toward a lifestyle dictated by Islamic fundamentalism rather than popular urges. Secularism has no home in that world. The probability of a growing rift between Arab sects seems certain. At the moment, the typical Iraqi appears to have little love for Iran, or for any other country they believe might be trying to exert influence on them (like the U.S.!). The seeming disconnect between how the Iraqis feel and how their leaders behave could have some very negative consequences.
Protests and demonstrations are all the rage here right now, but I couldn’t guess the outcome of unrest triggered by a push toward fundamentalist influence in Iraq. My concern is that I think Iraqis seek to embrace more of the simple joys in life. They want to dance, they want to sing. But if the departure of the U.S. troops becomes the impetus of a fundamentalist revival, December 31, 2011 might be known in Iraq as the day the music died.
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